By M. Schaad
This research explores the formula, strategies and influence of Britain's diplomatic efforts to urge the German executive to desert, regulate and later to amplify the eu fiscal neighborhood. Its major rivalry is that British international relations among the Messina convention of 1955 and the 1st club program of 1961 was once counterproductive.
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Additional resources for Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration, 1955-61 (St. Antony's Series)
Though the German response to the British telegram of November 1955 had clearly demonstrated to Whitehall the 48 Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy, 1955–61 futility of any attempt to inﬂuence the German government without offering an alternative to the Common Market, this communication was not interpreted as signalling the end of divisions within the German government, but led to a more in-depth appreciation of the character thereof.
3 If these factors thus temporarily suppressed open conﬂict within the German government, this is not to say that the ‘Euro-enthusiasts’ in the Auswärtiges Amt and the Bundeskanzleramt were now more hopeful regarding the conclusion of the Common Market project. France was seen as the weakest link in the integration efforts of the Six and her attitude at the forthcoming Venice conference was the subject of intense speculation. 4 The Auswärtiges Amt was therefore anxious to accommodate French demands, so as to in- Entering Wedge or Counterblast?
The second scenario envisaged a failure of the Common Market, which was expected to lead to a disillusionment of Western-minded Germans, especially the younger generation. The result would be a post-Adenauer Germany which would gravitate eastwards in order to seek an arrangement with the Soviet-Union over uniﬁcation. 43 Moreover, the depiction of Germany as a security problem was found not only in the Foreign Ofﬁce. Although Treasury ofﬁcials, and in particular Clarke himself, were initially sceptical about this motive, Chancellor Macmillan shared the Foreign Ofﬁce view:44 What then are we to do?